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The Discourse of the Current Right in Argentina: Articulations and Reconfigurations

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Introduction

During the last two decades, the growth of political expressions responding to right-wing positions could be observed in several countries around the world, in many cases confirmed with electoral victories. Current right-wing discourses are characterized for their ability to articulate in rather particular ways conservative and neoliberal elements along with reactionary and nationalist components in a dynamic historical process. Much of the literature that has been studying this process gives an account of the cultural, social and political transformations occurred in the phase of neoliberalism at the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first century that established conditions of possibility for this rising of new right, and all analyses agree in pointing out the complexity of the characterization of the phenomenon. According

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to Enzo Traverso, who chooses the term “post-fascisms” to name these “new faces of the right”, an aspect that stands out is their fluctuating and unstable ideological content, in which diverse political philosophies are mixed within the framework of a specific regime of historicity, at the beginning of the twenty-first century.¹ For Cas Mudde, this is the fourth post-war far-right wave, the beginning of which approximately coincided with that of the twenty-first century, not only in Europe but in the world.² Steven Forti talks about a new extreme right, which he defines as right 2.0. It is an authoritarian right that stands out for its ability to use new technologies for the greater dissemination of its discourse and for its ideological renewal. These features give it special access to young audiences. According to Forti, there is a turning point in 2016, starting from the triumph of the Leave campaign in the United Kingdom and the victory of Donald Trump in the United States presidential elections and the authoritarian turn of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey.³

In Latin America there is a group of historical experiences in recent years that can be seen as part of this global scenario.⁴ Concerning the situation in Argentina, a process can be distinguished in which two

¹ Enzo Traverso. *Las nuevas caras de la derecha*. (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2021), 25.

² Cas Mudde. *La Ultraderecha hoy*. (Barcelona: Paidós, 2019), 18–19.

Also, at his study Mudde provides the following terminological clarifications: “This book does not deal with the so-called “traditional” or conventional right, which is what concerns to conservatives and liberals (or “libertarians” in its American name) but focuses specifically on those right-wingers who are “anti-establishment,” an attitude defined here as hostility towards liberal democracy. This is what I call the “far-right,” which is further subdivided into two broad subgroups. The “extreme right”, which rejects the essence of democracy, that is, popular sovereignty and the majority principle. The most tragically famous example of the far right is fascism, which brought German Führer Adolf Hitler and Italian Duce Benito Mussolini to power, and was responsible for the most destructive war in world history. And the “radical right”, which accepts the essence of democracy, but opposes fundamental elements of liberal democracy, specially the rights of minorities, the rule of law and the separation of powers. Both subgroups oppose the postwar liberal consensus, although in fundamentally different ways. While the extreme right is revolutionary, the radical right tends to be “more reformist.” In essence, the radical right trusts in the power of the people and the extreme right does not.” (pp. 28–29).

³ Steven Forti, *Extrema derecha 2.0. Qué es y cómo combatirla*. (Madrid: Silgo XXI, 202), 85.

⁴ See: Daniel Feierstein et al. *La extrema derecha en América Latina*. (Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual, 2023), 101 and Ariel Goldstein. *La reconquista autoritaria*. (Buenos Aires: Ed. Marea, 2022), 245–246.

trends converge. One is the consolidation of the new right⁵ represented by the political force founded and led by Mauricio Macri, since 2005. Since 2019, the coalition has been turned into “Juntos por el Cambio” (JxC).⁶ Macri is a wealthy heir and businessman, former mayor of Buenos Aires city, and former president of Argentina in 2015.

At the same time, a new actor has emerged. We have been able to observe the rapid rise of a radical right coalition that strengthened into the political scene and that in the last two years has achieved a sustained presence and impact in the public discourse⁷ expressed in *La Libertad*

⁵ See: Gabriel Vommaro and Mariana Gené. *El sueño intacto de la centroderecha*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2023; Sergio Morresi, Ezequiel Saferstein and Martin Vicente, *Ganar la calle. Repertorios, memorias y convergencias de las manifestaciones derechistas argentinas*. Clepsidra. Revista Interdisciplinaria de Estudios sobre Memoria | Vol. 8, Núm 15, (2021), pp 134–151; Sergio Morresi, “Convergencias inesperadas de las derechas políticas”, in *Los nuevos rostros de la derecha en América Latina. Desafíos conceptuales y estudios de caso*. Andrea Bolcatto y Gastón Souroujon (Comps). Ed. UNL, 2020; Gabriel Vommaro, Sergio Morresi and Alejandro Belloti, *Mundo PRO*. Buenos Aires: Planeta. 2015; G. Vommaro; S. Morresi, *Hagamos equipo. PRO y la construcción de la nueva derecha en Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones UNGS, 2015; and G. Vommaro. *La larga marcha de Cambiemos. La construcción silenciosa de un proyecto de poder*. Siglo XXI, 2017.

⁶ Initially named as “Frente Compromiso para el Cambio” (Commitment Front for Change) in 2005, and then formed as a political party under the name “Propuesta Republicana” (Republican Proposal) in 2008, since its original formation, the main party PRO included politicians from the traditional right and business leaders from think tanks and NGOs (Vommaro and Morresi, 2015). In 2015, it became part of the “Alianza Cambiemos” (“Let’s Change Alliance”) which included the “Unión Cívica Radical” (Radical Civic Union), it was this alliance that led Mauricio Macri to win the presidential election that year. Since 2019, the coalition—made up of the political parties “Propuesta Republicana”, “Unión Cívica Radical”, “Coalición Cívica ARI” (Civic Coalition) and “Encuentro Republicano Federal” (Federal Republican Encounter)—is renamed as “Juntos por el Cambio” (Together for Change).

⁷ On this point, Pablo Stefanoni affirms: “Milei is, without a doubt, the one who most strongly put into circulation since 2015 a series of libertarian, and even anarcho-capitalist, clichés, in a country alien to such contempt for the State”. Pablo Stefanoni, *¿La rebeldía se volvió de derecha? Como el antiprogresismo y la anticorrección política están construyendo un nuevo sentido común -y por qué la izquierda debería tomarlos en serio-*. (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2021), 98. Also, the works of Ariel Goldstein can be seen for further development: “In the context of the economic, social and political crisis that Argentina is currently experiencing, the libertarian discourse against the State and economic regulations wielded by right-wing politicians and sectors in Argentina has become more dominant in culture and media. (...) At the same time, it is possible to observe the distrust among young people and a good part of society that views the political class with discredit, which has allowed the growth of figures such as the economist Javier Milei in a context of apathy and sadness.” Ariel Goldstein. *La reconquista autoritaria*. (Buenos Aires: Ed. Marea, 2022) 245–246.

Avanza (LLA),⁸ led by Javier Milei, an economist who worked for Corporación América,⁹ and who has had an increasing presence in debate television shows in the last decade.

From a discursive perspective within Critical Studies (CDS) and specifically from the framework of Discourse-Historical Approach¹⁰ (DHA) several field research has distinguished some of the reiterated features of the discourses of the European extreme right. From the point of view of content, articulation of ideological elements of diverse origins can be observed: nationalist, identity-based, conservative and neoliberal together with the reference to the failure of traditional parties to respond to contemporary crises. Regarding the analysis of rhetorical resources, it stands out the display of strategies of provocation and transgression of conversational maxims in the challenge of what is politically correct in emerging leaders who exhibit charisma in the style of showbusiness celebrities, along with a strategy of calculated ambivalence with traits of ideological flexibility. It is also noticed that to endorse the exclusion policies that are promoted, standardized justification procedures are used: appeal to authority, moral assessment, rationalization and

⁸ “La Libertad Avanza was an electoral coalition founded in 2021, made up of the “Partido Demócrata” (Democratic Party), the “Partido Libertario” (Libertarian Party), the “Unión por la Libertad y la Dignidad” party (Freedom and Dignity Union), the “Unión Celeste y Blanca” party (Celeste and Blanca Union,) the “Fe” party (Faith) and the Renovador Federal party (“Federal Renewal”) and since 2023 LLA is a political party founded by Javier Milei after winning the presidential election.

⁹ Corporación América is a business conglomerate chaired by one of the most powerful businessmen in Argentina, Eduardo Eurnekian.

¹⁰ From the perspective of Critical Discourse Studies, the team led by Ruth Wodak has developed the Discourse-Historical Approach that has been dedicated to research since the mid-1980s on anti-semitism, xenophobia, racism and nationalist discourse in Austria, focusing on the analysis of political discourse and media. In this regard, see, among others: Reisigl, M and Wodak, R. 2000. *Discourse and Discrimination*. London: Routledge; Wodak, R., de Cillia, R. and Reisigl, M. “The discursive construction of national identities”. *Scaffolding Journal of Social Research*, vol. 12, no. 27, (2015), 53–191 Autonomous University of Mexico City; Wodak, Ruth and Matouschek, B. “These are people whose origin can be guessed just by looking at them: critical discourse analysis and the study of neo-racism in contemporary Austria”, in Martín Rojo, L. (edl) *Being able to say or the power of speeches*, Barcelona: Gedisa. 2003. For recent contributions on theoretical and cases studies on right-wing discourses see: Ruth Wodak. *The Politics of Fear. The Shameless Normalization of Far-Right Discourse*. Sage. [2015] 2020 and Ruth Wodak, Jonathan Culpeper and Elena Semino, “Shameless normalization of impoliteness: Berlusconi’s and Trump’s press conferences”. *Discourse & Society* Vol. 32 (3), (2021) 369–393.

mythopoesis.¹¹ Worth mentioning, three more important on far-right discourse aspects are highlighted in the research that Ruth Wodak carried out for the second edition of *Politics of Fear*¹²: the incorporation of anti-gender contents, consequently the investment strategy of responsibility and causality in the victim-victimizer relationship and demonization of left-wing parties.

This set of features of right-wing rhetoric has a presence in Argentine public discourse, but this in turn presents its own specificities.¹³ Since 2019, the principal heads of the political coalitions JxC and LLA along with other right-wing leaders, have had to speak from their place of opposition to the national government. As we noted, in the last two years, since 2021, the voices that represent radicalized right-wing positions have intensified their presence and, in this process, the set of leaders who initially have been holding center-right discursive positions have found space for the radicalization of their expressions. The growth of J. Mieli promoted a new prominence of the figures further to the right within JxC and the hardening of M. Macri's discourse. As Macri himself said in 2021:

"Defining ourselves as gradualists was an elegant way to disguise the political weakness we had" (MM, March 18, 2021, presentation event for his book "Primer Tiempo").

Our purpose, thus, is to address the intertextual network¹⁴ that is produced and remains in circulation to observe movements towards

¹¹ Ruth Wodak. *The Politics of Fear. The Shameless Normalization of Far-Right Discourse*. (Sage 2015), 6.

¹² Ruth Wodak. *The Politics of Fear. The Shameless Normalization of Far-Right Discourse*. (Sage 2020), 12–13.

¹³ At National University of Quilmes (Universidad Nacional de Quilmes-UNQ) we have been developing this line of research in the last four years from the activities we carry out in the Discourse and Gender Group (Grupo de Discurso y Género- DIGES) in the Department of Social Sciences.

¹⁴ Intertextuality refers to the linking of texts with other texts that can occur through the presence of external voices in the text itself, based on evocations, topoi, assumptions and directly or indirectly referred discourse, or through continuous reference to a topic or to its main actors; through reference to the same events as the other texts; or by the reappearance of the main arguments of one text in another text. This last process is also called "recontextualization". See: Norman Fairclough. *Analysing discourse. Textual analysis for social research*. (London: Routledge, 2003), 39.

positions of visibility of some topics and strategies that were previously marginal, in what Ruth Wodak calls normalization processes.¹⁵

Socio-discursive Conjuncture and Political Actors: “Today Our Time Began”

Considering that discourses can be understood as a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action, a first approach to the historical context can be made in electoral terms. In the 2019 presidential election a victory of the “Frente de Todos” (FdT)—which brought together different parties within the Peronist movement—with 48.24% of the votes, placed Alberto Fernández in the presidency, with Cristina Fernández de Kirchner as Vice president. However, the right-wing alliance “Juntos por el Cambio” (JxC), headed by Mauricio Macri, with a formula that had him running for the presidency with Miguel Angel Pichetto -former Peronist deputy- for the vice-presidency, obtained 40.28%. It should be added that two other right-wing parties were running in the general election: “Frente Nos”¹⁶—registered into conservative, militarist and nationalist tradition—with candidacies of J.J Gómez Centurión and Cynthia Hotton, which had 1.71% of the votes and “Unidos por la Libertad” y “La Dignidad”—an expression of the neoliberal right—led by J.L Espert and Luis Rosales, with 1.47% of the votes.

Two years later, in 2021, legislative elections were held throughout the country in which JxC resulted victorious in most districts. As general results, it obtained 42.75% of the votes, while FdT reached the 34.56%. But the significant novelty in this scenario was the performance of the far-right coalition “La Libertad Avanza/Avanza Libertad”, led by Javier

¹⁵ Ruth Wodak. *The Politics of Fear. The Shameless Normalization of Far-Right Discourse*. Sage. [2015] 2020, p. 6 and Ruth Wodak, Jonathan Culpeper and Elena Semino, *Shameless normalization of impoliteness: Berlusconi's and Trump's press conferences*. *Discourse & Society* Vol. 32 (3), (2021) 369–393.

¹⁶ It was formed in 2018, in the context of parliamentary debate over the Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy Law, promoting activism against the sanction of the Law. Its main leader, Juan José Gómez Centurión, was a former official of JxC and member of PRO Party.

Milei, which obtained 5.55% of the votes at the national level, and in the district of the Federal Capital (running as “La Libertad Avanza” together with “Unite por la Libertad” y “La Dignidad”), reached 17.04% of the votes.

By the time we are finishing this writing, in November 2023, Javier Milei and Victoria Villarruel have been elected as President and Vice president of Argentina Republic, with the open support of Mauricio Macri after defeating the Peronist candidate, Sergio Massa for a difference of almost 12%, 55.65% to 44.35% in ballotage.

In summary, it is evident that a process of consolidation of the right in the political scene is developing. Furthermore, along with the dynamics that occur within party politics, the discursive scene shows abundant expressions of adherence and emphatic endorsement to these positions within non-party organizations or in the voices of different social actors such as journalists, columnists, influencers and references from different fields of culture and entertainment, as well as in editorial lines of traditional mass media.

Undoubtedly, there are many dimensions to consider as a turning point to the formation of this situation, here we underline three of them we think that have been substantial and intertwined. The discontent caused during the Covid.19 pandemic with the vaccination policies and extended quarantine¹⁷ measures, mobilized considerable reactions. In Argentina, in 2020 and 2021, these demonstrations were extremely

¹⁷ Although readings such as Enzo Traverso's maintain that the pandemic was a time of setback for the right, taking the case of the governments of J. Bolsonaro and D. Trump, among others, since their responses consisted of pure denial, they were ineffective and this may be related to their subsequent defeats (Traverso, *Las nuevas caras*, 14), we consider that another hypothesis can be drawn for the Argentine reality. In 2019 and 2020, the streets of several cities in the country and social networks were seen populated with demonstrations and reactionary speeches that, during the Covid-19 pandemic, expressed themselves against the quarantine measures, and opposed the health measures of vaccination and use of masks, among others. There were political leaders and public figures who shared, supported and promoted these reactionary positions. This can be considered an important factor among the conditions of possibility that arose so that, starting in 2021, a neoreactionary rhetoric that emphasized social unrest due to public quarantine policies and the consequences of successive quarantines on economic activity, will become increasingly vigorous in Argentina. According to Morresi, Safersteion and Vicente, conservative liberalism and reactionary nationalism of the right converged in these demonstrations. Luisa Martín Rojo's analysis of the Spanish case and the campaign that circulated “conspiracy and right-wing libertarian theories (...) and a neoliberal political rationality opposed to state intervention in all spheres of human life” (Martín Rojo, *ibíd*, 134). Martín

aggressive, including posters calling to kill politicians and journalists, gallows with the logo of FdT and the phrase “Prisoners, dead or exiled”, and black bags simulating corpses with signs with the personal names of public figures from government and human rights organizations. Such discomfort was deeply linked with the previous economic recession that was dramatically increased and extended in this context. It was next to this situation that occurred in the mentioned legislative elections of 2021 in which there were resounding electoral victories for the right. It was precisely in 2021 when Javier Milei founded “La Libertad Avanza” and achieved a chair in the National Congress along with Victoria Villarruel, a lawyer who discusses the policies and activism of human rights organizations, denies the concept of State Terrorism, and places a false equivalence between crimes against humanity committed for Armed forces during the last dictatorship with the action of armed organizations. Villarruel, then, became the first member of the network of “complete memory” groups¹⁸ to be elected as a National Deputy. In this sense, in a speech in October 2021, she said: “Today our time began”.¹⁹ A couple of months before, in his first political act in a public square in the city of Buenos Aires, Javier Milei affirmed: “Today the reconstruction of Argentina begins. Last year I celebrated my birthday here, and I promised myself that I was going to get into politics, that I was going to get into the mud to kick the asses out of politicians”. The convoking motto was “Them against us”.

An unavoidable event of political violence must be added to this list of facts: on September 1, 2022, Vice President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was the victim of an assassination attempt. A man named

Rojo considers in his analysis that the discursive strategy against Covid-19 has been crucial for the victory of the Spanish right.

¹⁸ The so-called “complete memory” groups in Argentina emerged in the 90s to dispute the Memory, Truth and Justice policies of the Argentine State. These policies gave rise since the recovery of democracy in 1983 to investigations and trials for crimes against humanity committed by military responsible during the military dictatorship established in the country after the military coup of March 24, 1976. In the same sense, Victoria Villarruel founded the NGO Center for Legal Studies on Terrorism and its Victims (CELTIVY) in 2006, partly promoted as a response to the memory policies of Néstor Kirchner’s government.

¹⁹ See Cristian Palmisciano. “El tiempo de los otros. Memorias y nuevas derechas, un análisis a partir de la carrera militante de Victoria Villarruel”. *Clepsidra. Revista interdisciplinaria sobre estudios de memoria*. (2022) Vol. 9, nº 17, 54–69.

Fernando Sabag Montiel shot her in the face with a firearm, but the bullet did not come out. It happened in a public situation, on the street, in view of a crowd present and in front of television cameras. Quickly, this episode was understood by several analysts as directly related with hate speech that circulated in mass media,²⁰ social media and in street demonstrations during the recent years.²¹

We are witnessing, then, a particular configuration that shows a complex social and political process in progress. We think we can understand this moment as a socio-historical conjuncture that constitutes, in turn, a discursive conjuncture²² given a series of related discursive events which come together based on certain rearticulations that are confirmed in sustained practices.²³ The boundaries of what can be said shift and representations that were previously on the margins and considered isolated begin to become normalized. Thus, topics are reconfigured and meanings in tension are reframed. From these coordinates, and from a discursive approach which includes an interdisciplinary perspective, we aim to characterize a distinctive articulation of aspects of right-wing and radical right discourses, on one hand attending to the main features

²⁰ About the representation of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner as an “unruly woman” see Ana Aymá, “Imagen, política y género. Los retratos de Cristina Fernández y Mauricio Macri en las tapas de Noticias” Publicación Cuaderno 112 “Imagen e Identidad Política en América Latina, junio 2020, en colección Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios de Diseño y Comunicación. Facultad de Diseño y Comunicación. Universidad de Palermo, Buenos Aires; and Sara Pérez and Ana Aymá: “Multimodalidad, género y política. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner en Noticias”, Revista Observatório, Unesp, Brasil. Vol. 3, (2017).

²¹ On this point, it should be noted that, in parallel, Justice investigated the Federal Revolution group. This group made its first public appearance on May 25, 2022, through a call on Twitter for a march named “March of the Torches” in which they invited “to persecute politicians and journalists who were complicit in the return of Kirchnerism” and to “make them shit.” The two young founders of Revolución Federal, Jonathan Morel and Leonardo Sosa, supported Mauricio Macri’s presidential candidacy in 2015 and then turned to libertarianism. In an interview published in Revista Anfibia, Morel declared that the group had the purpose that Kirchneristas “be afraid of being Kirchneristas.” (Nicolas Baintrub. 2022. Revista Anfibia <https://www.revistaanfibia.com/revolucion-federal-que-tengan-miedo-de-ser-kirchneristas/>).

²² Alejandro Raiter, “‘Hablo y entiendan’: creencias, presuposición e interdiscurso en los actos de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner”. *Oralia* vol. 12, (2009) Arco Libros. Madrid, 73–96.

²³ Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough. *Discourse in Late Modernity. Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*. (Edinburgh: University Press, 1999), 22.

aligned with global frame, but also looking into specific features relative to Argentina's context, and the reconfigurations from right-wing towards radical right positions.

Discursive Approach, Topics and the Disputed Meanings

From the critical discursive perspective language is seen as a social practice that constructs ways of representing the world²⁴ endowed with materiality and subject to historical conditions of production. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it. This implies considering power relations and ideological constructions as a constitutive dimension of discourses. Thus, CDA understands discourses as relatively stable uses of language serving the organization and structuring of social life.²⁵ Therefore, discourse analysis allows us to account for transversal strategies in certain enunciative scenes,²⁶ which function as forms of legitimation of these positions, and which dispute the meaning of central representations in the order of discourse. In terms of Fairclough, based on Foucault's category, it implies attending to the tensions between different social orders of discourses, defined as the discursive aspect of hegemonies open to articulation, meaning struggle and transformation.²⁷ In this sense, here we will focus on political speeches of everyday politics, produced by political leaders and actors of JxC and LLA -the two electorally competitive

²⁴ Norman Fairclough. *Analysing discourse. Textual analysis for social research.* (London: Routledge, 2003), 25–26.

²⁵ Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer. *Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory, and Methodology*, 2009, 8.

²⁶ Irene Fonte Zarabozo proposes the metaphor of the enunciative scene to “account for the concert of voices enunciated in the press: voices of varied prominence, role and hierarchy.” In the author's formulation, the notion allows us to look at the discursive circulation of major themes and a certain ideological complex. In: Fonte Zarabozo, I. “Analyze a historical case in a corpus of journalistic discourses: Cuba and the United States (1906–1921).” *Journal of Applied Linguistics Studies*. UNAM Year 25, No. 46 (2007).

²⁷ Norman Fairclough. *Media discourse.* (London: Hodder, 1995), pp. 72–74.

coalitions-, which have different levels of representativeness of their spaces. The discourses that make up the corpus were pronounced between 2019 and 2023 and belong to different political sub-genres related to different fields of action: institutional speeches delivered in spaces in front of an audience; declarations arising from appearances in mass media; other kind of semiotic products as posters, slogans and campaign texts; and messages broadcast on politician's official social media.

From JxC, we focus on Mauricio Macri, who usually talks before attendees with an invitation without risk of being exposed to unannounced questions; Patricia Bullrich (former security minister in the MM government, and presidential candidate for JxC in 2023), whose speeches at public events are not widely available, but she offers lots of press conferences, and presents on her social networks a linktr.ee link that brings together a series of communication pieces from his interventions during 2022 and early 2023 in different media, which include some oral presentations to restricted audiences; and two leaders who joined JxC in 2019: Miguel Angel Pichetto (he participated as a candidate for vice president in M. Macri's formula and in 2023 as a candidate for deputy) and José Luis Espert (in 2023 headed the list of candidates for national senators for the Province of Buenos Aires). Both Pichetto and Espert provide daily statements, in mass media and social media, on specific topics that cover an increasingly radicalized right-wing agenda.²⁸ From LLA, we focus on Javier Milei who has frequently given speeches in public spaces and on tours of different neighborhoods and towns, before those who go to listen to him (for example, he carried out part of his campaign for deputy in 2021 by giving public classes in squares in the city of Buenos Aires), and Victoria Villarruel who also has an intense

²⁸ Mariana Gené and Gabriel Vommaro pointed out: "The space for right-wing discourse is greater now because the political polarization is also greater, with the most defined conglomerates on either side of the center. At the same time, the growth of libertarian and far-right options also generates favorable conditions for a more radical discourse. If in 2019 the presidential candidacies of Espert and Gómez Centurión already announced the expansion of the right-wing space outside Cambiemos, with conservative positions in cultural terms and liberal in economic terms, the subsequent growth of the figure of Javier Milei came to widen that semantic field" (Gené and Vommaro, 2023, *El sueño intacto de la centroderecha. Y sus dilemas después de haber gobernado y fracasado*, pp. 299–300).

performance on television sets. It should be mentioned that Espert, Milei and Villarruel were signatories of the anti-communist manifesto Madrid Charter in 2020.

Attending this framework, even if we dedicate ourselves to observing pieces of political discourse, we can see how each public expression competes for salience in a media ecosystem that is both dynamic and saturated. Following Nick Couldry,²⁹ we consider the media as ecology that combines the logic of traditional mass media and social media in the digital scenario: the large scale and the community of shared values, and where reproduction depends on what is said managing to capture the attention of fragmented and polarized audiences. Therefore, looking at the conjuncture implies considering the functioning of media discursive practices that struggle for audience's attention, which generates a meaning construction based on their momentary impact. Nevertheless, these are also technologies capable of producing, transmitting, and preserving meanings regularly across space and time. That is, media and social networks carry out a set of operations simultaneously, namely: they identify what counts as significant; they function as a privileged and guaranteed access point to what should be considered central; and prioritize that data according to established values. All this works in a feedback loop because the media hold the power to name, frame and hierarchize themselves within these privileged signs and naturalize the operations they carry out. We understand them, then, as power devices that act as an environment that models the presence of societies and represents them in front of their members. Of course, there are many ways in which the public accepts, interprets, incorporates, or re-signifies mediated semiotic products in their lives. And, although the personal experience of lived events is *prima facie* relevant, it can be readjusted so that it is coherent with the collective narratives and the interpretation of events socially shaped in certain orders of discourse.

From this perspective, we question what meanings are disputed and what displacements occur in the discursive orders, starting from finding the recurring topics and the strategies used for the construction of representations and identities in the discourse. As mentioned before, in this

²⁹ Nick Couldry. *Media. Why It Matters*. (Cambridge: Polity Press. 2020), 27.

context of polarization, accentuated in the current year, 2023, in which presidential elections are held in Argentina, the public discourse of leading political actors from right-wing parties has been moving towards increasingly extreme positions. Among the representations related to right-wing ideology, produced, and replicated in the media ecosystem and distributed in the voices of referents of different levels of responsibility and visibility, reiterated contents can be found in the last four years.³⁰ In our analysis, we classify the most salient and recurring representations into five macro-topics. Our hypothesis is that these topics—understood as semantic macrostructures³¹—are articulated to each other contributing to an internal consistency of this public discourse.

First, regarding a component of appeals and promises we can find mostly in JxC leaders, but also in LLA, the most prominent topic is the call to the need for order addressed to demand tightening of security policy and the application of heavy-handed enforcement. It comes with the authoritarian vision that the objective of achieving security for the people is inseparable to violent action by police forces and this includes repressive measures against social protest. And in recent political campaign, order was a central significance.

³⁰ Different investigations have been highlighting some topics of this repertoire. To see examples and analysis, the following texts, among others, can be consulted: -Aymá, Ana. “Imagen, política y verdad. El discurso visual de la Alianza Cambiemos en los spots de campaña para las PASO 2015”, in: Aymá, Ana y Dagatti, Mariano (Eds.) *La política en escena. Voces, cuerpos e imágenes en la Argentina del siglo XXI*, en Colección Textos y Lecturas en Ciencias Sociales. Departamento de Ciencias Sociales, Bernal, Buenos Aires, Ed. Universidad Nacional De Quilmes. 2020. -Ipar, Ezequiel. “Una rebelión contra la igualdad en Argentina”. In: Badiou et al., *Neofascismo. ¿Cómo surgió la extrema derecha global (y cuáles pueden ser sus consecuencias)?*, *Le Monde Diplomatique / Capital Intelectual*. 2022. -Catanzaro, Gisela. *Espectrología de la derecha. Hacia una crítica de la ideología neoliberal en el capitalismo tardío*. Buenos Aires, Ed. Las Cuarenta. 2021 -Sara Pérez y Florencia Moragas. “La guerra retórica contra las mujeres”, en: Ipar, E., Wegelin, L., and Cuesta, M. (Eds.) *Democracia, dilemas y desafíos*. Buenos Aires. Secretaría de Derechos Humanos del Ministerio de Justicia de la Nación, 2023. -Paula Biglieri y Gloria Perelló. “El anti-populismo en la Argentina del siglo XXI o cuando el odio se vuelve un factor político estructurante” *REVCOM. Revista Redcom*, núm. 10, (2020). -Virginia Morales. “Entre reapropiaciones y legados. El léxico político de los derechos humanos en las derechas argentinas del siglo XXI”. *Clepsidra. Revista interdisciplinaria sobre estudios de memoria*. Vol. 9, nº 17, (2022). 32–53. -Ezequiel Adamovsky. “Mapuches, la construcción de un enemigo extranjero”, 2023, in https://www.eldiarioar.com/opinion/mapuches-construccion-enemigo-extranjero_129_10100360.html.

³¹ Teun van Dijk, *Análisis Crítico del discurso*. Revista Austral de Ciencias Sociales 30 (2016), 203–222, p. 206.

“We want an orderly State, an orderly society and also an orderly police”. (P. Bullrich, campaign speech, March 17, 2023).

“What needs to be done in Argentina can be summed up in a single word: order. Order must be reestablished, and the State must stop managing everything. Bureaucracies must be adjusted”. (Patricia Bullrich, at the XVI Atlantic Forum organized in Madrid by International Freedom Foundation, June 30, 2023).

The promise of order comes with the promise to act: the programmatic duty component of the capacity to do, relating to the future, is linked to the prescriptive component of universal imperatives.

“For criminals to start to be afraid, there must be some who end up well screwed up first, otherwise the message will not be clear. Here we must give a clear message first, and then let’s start talking about jail or bullet, but first it is bullet”. (José Luis Espert, at that time candidate for deputy for La Libertad Avanza, interview on Radio Rivadavia, November 8, 2021).

“If you lose to a drug trafficker or a violent group, with a clear and very specific law, the Armed Forces can be used so that the law and the Constitution govern in that territory”. (Patricia Bullrich, television interview on LN+, October 12, 2022).

“We defend citizens, not like Kirchnerism, which frees criminals”. (P. Bullrich, presidential debate, October 2023).

“Order will be our main foundation in security policy. The citizens with us, the criminals with those who release criminals. Who makes, it pays”. (P. Bullrich, presidential debate, October 2023).

Secondly, and specially in LLA discourse, there is the exaltation of the value of freedom associated with the neoliberal principle of market freedom against public policies and State intervention in any area. This topic has been pointed repeatedly by specialized literature³²: the appeal to freedom emerges as a sign of a context marked by the lack of utopias and horizons of expectations and by an amplification of the neoliberal postulate of the principle of freedom as absolute freedom. Mostly it is

³² Traverso, *Las nuevas caras*, 138–139.

articulated with an insistent hostility towards basic concepts of democracy such as social justice and equality represents a strong part of Javier Milei's statements.

"I believe in the freedom of individuals, I believe in self-government, in spontaneous order." (J. Milei, debate with Juan Grabois, May 29, 2023).

"The new barbarism is social justice." (J.M. LN+, October 3, 2020).

"With this idea of social justice, a violent and unjust idea because it implies treating people unequally before the law, it implies taking from one to give to another". (Javier Milei, speech in Vox festival, Madrid, October, 2022).

"The main generator of violence is the State" (J. Milei, debate with Juan Grabois, May 29, 2023).

"Once they exhaust these sources such as indebtedness or monetary issuance, they simply resort to the violence involved in collecting taxes, or where they believe the taxes come from, at gunpoint, coercion, no one pays them voluntarily". (Javier Milei, speech in Vox festival, Madrid, October, 2022).

"In terms of economics, basically what socialists say is that the capitalist system of free enterprise is unfair, so they try to put on one side the supposed socialist altruism, versus liberal individualism." (Javier Milei, speech in Vox festival, Madrid, October 2022).

Following Wendy Brown's analysis, neoliberalism not just saturates the content and meaning of democracy with market values, but, in addition, attacks the principles, practices, cultures, subjects and institutions of democracy, understood as "government of the people".³³

In third place, in both coalitions stands out an open rejection for public policies to defend and expand rights. And that point relates directly with an aggressive confrontation with collectivism, social movements, and social protest. Then, in Argentina one can find manifest attacks and systematic stigmatizations in what constitutes the construction of an antagonistic discursive frontier against feminisms, LGBT demands and gender policies; against indigenous communities called

³³ Wendy Brown, *En las ruinas del neoliberalismo. El ascenso de las políticas antidemocráticas en Occidente*. (Buenos Aires: Tinta Limón, 2020), 44–45.

“pueblos originarios”, specifically the Mapuche people; and against precarious sectors of society that receive aid from the State. These contents can also be recognized as key components of conservative right that are recontextualized here. It could be said that one way of understanding this anti-gender, homophobic and racist agenda, according to Nancy Fraser’s analysis,³⁴ is that the progressive policies of recognition and expansion of rights that occurred in parallel with regressive distributive policies caused an amount of discomfort which ended up translated into the conservative reaction against the recognized social groups, and that constituted one of the grounds for the rise of the right. But it is also true that there is a moral component in far-right discourses which tends to choose women and gender activism as enemies.³⁵ As Melinda Cooper³⁶ points out right-wing neoconservatism sees the welfare State as a cause of what it considers to be the crisis of the family and traditional moral values.

³⁴ Nancy Fraser, *Contrahegemonía ya!*, (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2019), 42. The analysis refers to the United States case and the electoral victory of D.Trump, but is also illustrative on what happened in other countries around the world, understood as a backlash reaction to progressive public policies.

³⁵ For a discussion of the recent debate over the free and safe abortion law in Argentina see: Ana Aymá, Sara Pérez, Florencia Moragas and Emilse Kejner. “Análisis de la cobertura periodística del debate legislativo sobre la Ley de Interrupción Voluntaria del Embarazo (Argentina, 2020)”, en Dulbecco, P... [et al.]. *El aborto en el Congreso: Argentina 2018–2020*. - 1a ed. - Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad-CEDES, (2021) <https://repositorio.cedes.org/handle/123456789/4632>. ISBN 978–987–48105–0–2. Also, in previous works we have analyzed how anti-feminist online activism has demonized women’s demands on abortion and built a group identity around this: Ana Aymá “Discourse, identity, and networks: the “celestial” groups during the debate of the law on voluntary interruption of pregnancy in Argentina in 2020”, (unedited). On this point, Sara Pérez and Florencia Moragas show how between the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2017 in Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Paraguay, Ecuador, Mexico and Uruguay there were demonstrations against progress in gender policies in what can be recognized as a regional phenomenon that does not refer only to traditional discourses linked to religious values and that has the active presence of civil society organizations (Pérez and Moragas, *La guerra*, 85–86).

³⁶ Melinda Copper, *Los valores de la familia. Entre el neoliberalismo y el nuevo social-conservadurismo*. (Madrid: Traficante de sueños, 2022), 79.

“Thus, basically there is gender ideology, ethnic conflicts, the issue of ethnic groups, the issue of indigenous peoples, the ecological agenda, inclusive language, all things to destroy the values of society and obviously that is not unrelated to the agenda in terms of the economy” (Javier Milei, speech in Madrid, Vox festival, October 2022).

“I’m not going to be, that is, because I’m blonde with blue eyes, a man, or I’m going to be asking for forgiveness for having a penis, that is, God, I say, I don’t have to feel ashamed of being a man, white, blonde, with blue eyes, I am not going to concede anything to cultural Marxism, you know that the Ministry of women, out, because the only equality that is worth is the equality of the law” (J. Milei, 2022, Book Fair).

“If women earned less than men, companies would be full of them” (J. Milei, CNN interview, 2021).

Furthermore, in the Argentine case, the construction of the internal enemy referring to the native peoples has also been relevant, as their struggles imply the demand that ancestral lands be returned to them.

“In light of recent events with the *maputruchos* (false Mapuche) and the actions of the government, I wonder, are we now facing Mapuche Kirchnerism? If anyone knows, I’m listening carefully...” (J. Milei, Tweet, October 13, 2022).

As can be seen, feminism and Mapuche movements are labeled as enemies, because in their claim for equality, they represent cultural Marxism, and stand as a menace to white men. The inequality of social structure is openly denied as a problem considered as an unavoidable aspect of natural reality. As part of these issues, we can find the confrontation with public education considered as a government indoctrination device:

“Public education is a brainwashing machine, of indoctrinating exactly, so they live indoctrinating, if there is one thing I can assure you it is that my government will not have cultural Marxism” (J. Milei, interview at Buenos Aires Book Fair, 2022).

Fourthly, it has been an increase in public discourse of expressions against policies and organizations of recent memory and human rights, which include denialist statements about the status of the victims of the

military dictatorship of 1976³⁷ unfold into a revisionist narrative and using what Ruth Wodak³⁸ explains as a calculated ambivalence strategy naming the dictatorship as a war and human rights policy as a business. As Wodak³⁹ points out when she refers to Holocaust denial, the narrative of denial is disguised as challenges to hegemonic historical theories and established facts:

“Enough of feeling that they (Kirchnerist government) have moral authority. They have no moral authority. They have even used the tragedy that we experienced in Argentina, for what I describe as the “business” of human rights.” (M. Macri, seminar at the University of Higher Economic Studies, June 22, 2023).

“On the other hand, we are absolutely against a one-eyed vision of history. For us, during the ‘70s there was a war and in that war the State forces committed excesses and because they have a monopoly on violence, they deserve the full weight of the law, but also the terrorists of Montoneros, of the ERP, killed people, put bombs, made disasters, and committed crimes against humanity”. (J. Milei, presidential debate, October 2023).

“When we talk about human rights, unfortunately there is a business and a painful cause for all Argentines that has been used to receive compensation, subsidies, public positions and trips” (Victoria Villarruel, interview on LN+, November 2023).

“The 30 thousand are not true. There were not 30 thousand *desaparecidos* (persons victims of enforced disappearance) in this country.” (Victoria Villarruel, interview on America TV, August 17, 2021).

³⁷ Added to this type of statements is the increase in publications on social networks and graffiti with threatening messages directed at union members, students, and politicians, such as: “Go run, fucking lefties,” with images of the green Falcón car, which is a symbol of the kidnappings followed by torture and death committed by soldiers during the last military dictatorship, and swastikas. See: <https://www.infogremiales.com.ar/se-viene-el-falcon-verde-van-a-correr-zurdos-de-mierda-la-amenaza-a-los-trabajadores-del-hospital-durand/> <https://www.telam.com.ar/notas/202311/646714-amenazas-milei-mendoza.html> <https://www.telam.com.ar/notas/202311/646567-presidente-juventud-radical-portena-agustin-rombola-amenazas.html>.

³⁸ Wodak, Politics, 46–47.

³⁹ *Ibíd.*

To discuss the number of victims of enforced disappearance has been one of the historical strategies for revisionism and denial, a procedure that constitutes a method in terms of T. Adorno.⁴⁰

In fifth place, the anti-populist and anti-Peronist factors act as a recurring axis of the discourse of both coalitions. There, Peronists and Kirchnerists need to be excluded from the new order to construct.

“Populism is much more dangerous than the coronavirus”. (M. Macri, presentation event for his book *Primer Tiempo*, March 18, 2021).

“Especially in the last 20 years, Peronism embraced truly destructive ideas, a dark perverse culture of power that started by taking over the State, colonizing it and destroying it and bringing it to a size that crushed economic activity, and prevented for more than a decade the creation of work in the private sector and on top of that it isolated us from the world.” (M. Macri, dissertation at the Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production, Cicyp, April 2023).

The fourth and fifth topics are rather specific points, as well, and both can also be read as recontextualizations of previous representations available into social imaginary. Historically, anti-Peronist positions in society have been held, and opinions that consider crimes against humanity just as an “excess” from the military could be heard in any conversation. Now these topics have entered the public discourse that builds the great consensus.

In 1979, Stuart Hall⁴¹ pointed out how Thatcherite philosophy⁴² focused on the reestablishment of a series of conservative social values

⁴⁰ As T. Adorno said about fascism in society: “Using the pseudo-scientific pedantry peculiar to these movements, they cast doubt on the number of murdered Jews. And first they say, ‘Well, it wasn’t six million, only five and a half’, and from that point it soon becomes dubious whether any were murdered at all, and finally things are presented as if it had actually been the other way around. So, I think that one should view these matters with particular vigilance.” Theodor Adorno, *Rasgos del nuevo radicalismo de derecha*, (Buenos Aires: Taururs, 2020), 13.

⁴¹ Stuart Hall, *El gran espectáculo de la derecha*. Revista Mexicana de Sociología, Vol. 43, Número extraordinario, (1981) pp. 1723–1743.

⁴² It should be noted that Javier Milei, has repeatedly declared his admiration for Margaret Thatcher: “I feel very identified, in historical terms, basically with Churchill, with Reagan and with Margaret Thatcher” (J.M. in interview of June 18, 2022, retrieved at https://www.clarin.com/politica/-siento-identificado-margaret-thatcher-polemica-respuesta-javier-milei-medio-aniversariomalvinas_0_v8zUJchWxR.html?gclid=CjwKCAiAmZGrBhAnEiwAo9qHibll9Ivofjmb1heJP3LgL5tZ_qeMp9V5RpFLyFHkHaOdL_9lBzGM1GRoCxcRQAvD_BwE).

such as competition, personal responsibility for efforts and rewards, the figure of the individual burdened by taxes and annoyed by state protectionism, and the counterfigure of the “beggar” embodying popular evil. This repertoire is also intertwined in this socio-historical juncture with key themes of the radical right, mainly: order, the need for social discipline and authority, the internal enemy, the threat of anarchy and racism in defense of national identity. And a central axis is verified at the educational level: the fear of “indoctrination” and “low-level” education is promoted to support the attack on public education, teachers, and unions. In short, a process of intimidation and moralization that Hall calls “the great syntax of good versus evil”.⁴³

As Wendy Brown explained, neoliberalism is not only a set of economic policies, an ideology and a relationship between the State and the economy, it is a culture, a vocabulary and an imaginary.⁴⁴ These topics place central meanings such as equality, social justice, and State terrorism under discussion. The signifiers of redistribution are inverted, equality and social justice are defined in terms of violence and State terrorism in terms of excess or equivalent part of a confrontation with armed groups. Facing this dispute, a set of legitimization strategies are displayed in radical right discourses to endorse the repertory of showed topics.

Legitimation Strategies and Reconfigurations: An Exclusionary Rhetoric

These themes are articulated in discursive strategies that function as points of support for a rhetoric that rejects equality, social justice, redistribution, and the expansion of rights, and proposes repression and exclusion of the social sectors that represent these ideas. One of the strategies used as a base for the representation of this “otherness” as

⁴³ Stuart Hall, *El gran espectáculo*, 1735.

⁴⁴ Wendy Brown, *El pueblo sin atributos. La secreta revolución del neoliberalismo*. (Barcelona: Malpaso, 2015), 19–20.

a “them” to be eradicated is the “topos of threat or of danger” and a “moral topos” against corruption. Topoi act as warrant for the transition from an argument to the conclusion, in this sense, if there are sectors from which society needs to be defended, action must be taken. On one hand, populism is a virus and Peronist ideas are destructive, dark, and perverse. On the other hand, Feminists, Mapuche and Human Rights organisms are depicted as an otherness from society itself. Their demands threaten order and freedom and are corrupt. Their image is constructed as if they imposed their demands on a society that must pay the cost of these. Claiming for equality or social justice is reframed as “violence”, so violence would be needed to confront it. Same violence should be used against criminals. That’s all about restoring order.

This is supported in a particular resource of the language of legitimation: the mythopoetic narrative that, in this case, appeals to a glorious past connected to the fantasy of the regeneration of a homogeneous community. A model past that must be acclaimed, even when it was based on the extermination of the original populations of the territory.

“Argentine decline did not begin yesterday; Argentine decline began more than a hundred years ago. Argentina ended the nineteenth century being the richest country in the world. When Argentina embraced the ideas of freedom starting in 1860, the Alberdi constitution of ‘53, with its own modifications to annex the province of Buenos Aires, went from being a country of barbarians in 35 years to becoming the first world power.” (Javier Milei. Conference at Cicyp, June 29, 2023).

“We must re-establish order and vindicate Julio Argentino Roca” (Miguel Pichetto, interviewed on the LaNación + TV, August 31, 2022).

“In these days when, with indolence and total irresponsibility, our sovereignty in Patagonia is allowed to be put at risk, the anniversary of the death of Julio Argentino Roca magnifies the figure of the builder of the ordered, prosperous, and open Argentina to the world that we dream of.” (P. Bullrich, tweet, October 19, 2022).

Julio Argentino Roca was Minister of War during the so-called Desert Campaign between 1878 and 1885 in which the Mapuche, Pampa, Tehuelche and Ranquel indigenous peoples were subdued and exterminated. Ordered Argentina is based on original violence. Which is also disciplinary violence. In this sense, this legitimation strategy is articulated

to the construction of certain social sectors as a thread: the communities of the Mapuche people, organized groups such as feminists and human rights organizations.

In relation with antagonism and nostalgic narrative of violent past, we find the figure of the leader convened from a “topos of saviour”—meaning a figure for salvation. A leader with a reactionary ethos is proposed to rescue those who were left behind, as a representation of a fed-up society. These right-wing politicians perform this style as a habitus, including provocative gestures and the display of incorrectness in pursuit of an effect of authenticity. Along with the construction of collective and massive entities to confront (populism, political caste) and the rejection of “too much goodness”, because in front there is a “demolition army”.

“I ask you to accompany us in this moral revolution, to go to a society that wants to live with the fruit of its work. First there are those of us who work our asses off, not the political caste. It is not an easy task, but I did not come here to guide lambs, I came here to awaken lions.” (J. Milei, public speech in Plaza Holanda, August, 7, 2021).

“They can’t stop me anymore, no progressive can stop me, I can’t take that cynical progressive discourse anymore, no more. Stop stealing people’s future, stop, stop, stop. Mr. Pichetto is right when he says, “too much goodness”, he punishes me and he is right, he is right. (...) The demolition army in front of us. (M. Macri, speech at Rural, presentation event of his book *¿Para qué?*, October 2022).

“We need strong leadership, we can no longer do so with lukewarm leadership” (P. Bullrich, interview on Radio Continental, August 10, 2023).

Turning back into the first quote of this text, time of weakness, or gradualism, is past time:

“Defining ourselves as gradualists was an elegant way to disguise the political weakness we had” (M. Macri, presentation event for his book *Primer Tiempo*, March 18, 2021).

It is important to consider that media in contemporary societies carry out in intensified and efficient ways what Nick Couldry, taking up the

text “On Justification”, from Boltanski and Thévenot, calls “commonize”: sharing and providing common reference points that function in the consolidation of certain values or disvalues from their insertion in the everyday life.⁴⁵ Here, this process of “normalization” occurs by operating a shift towards the legitimation of violence and this is combined with three simultaneous operations: the attributes of the leader who overacts courage and promises strength, the denigration of the weak as disvalue, and the attribution of dangerousness to precarious social actors who manifest themselves in public protests with the need to “be strong” to repress them. There, the mythopoetic past that is cited as a model is that of the conquest of the late nineteenth century that was founded on an extermination and promises a homogeneous and powerful community.

Concluding Remarks

According to the public discourse we can say that it is since 2021 that a greater displacement began to be observed clearly towards more radical expressions. That does not mean that these elements did not exist before, but that they are articulated in new configurations: an otherness is constructed that represents a collective threat composed of social and political antagonisms, a review of the recent past that does not recognize the dimensions of the crimes against humanity perpetrated by State terrorism; a mythopoetic narrative of the historical past, about the founding moment of civilization even under the extermination that it meant; and a promise of a future that achieves a new order. It is this reconfiguration that generates a novelty of the time.

It is appropriate to highlight that, following Foucault’s⁴⁶ statements, it is not possible, it is not given to us, to speak at any time about any topic or object. But this does not even imply that the “new” objects are waiting for their visibility, since they do not pre-exist in their emergence, but rather depend on the conditions of the bundle of relations

⁴⁵ Nick Couldry. *Media, Society, World: Social Theory and Digital Media Practice*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 66.

⁴⁶ Michel Foucault, *El orden del discurso*, (Barcelona: Tusquets, 1987), 11.

that generate that emergence; nor that they are created *ex nihilo*. Rather, they are reconfigurations that result from the complex link truth/power, not as an order that subjugates another, but as a mode of production. The boundaries of what is sayable are, of course, not natural limits, they are historically constructed as forms of regulation. They are consolidated by forming principles that are historically and socially sedimented and that define what is sayable or what is visible. These movements, theoretical and political, that claim the voices of those who were historically subjected to positions of subalternity, and fight for the visibility of these relations of inequality and their transformation are part of this discursive struggle. In the situation that we are analyzing here, these historical constructions are linked to disputes over meanings that recent decades have marked, in the field of memory and human rights, in the field of feminism, in the field of decolonialism. It is these advances, in symbolic and material terms, that are, once again, being contested under current displacements.